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RIBOT'S THEORY OF THE PASSIONS[1]

CLASSIFICATIONS of feelings present peculiar obstacles, and perhaps no attempt as yet has met with even a fair degree of success. The most approved general step was that of James, who somewhat ruthlessly set aside all elaborate classifications as useless, indeed, even positively bad. The new sensational or cognitive character, however, to which affective life seemed ultimately reducible on his scheme, though admirable indeed in that it affords a single fundamental basis for classification, yet somehow does seem to fail to take into account all one means by feelings. The latest attempts to adjust this theory, those of William McDougall and of Judd, show how difficult such a task is. It is noticeable also that relatively slight attention is paid to this phase of mental activity in these treatises.

I have attempted before in this JOURNAL[2] to report one rather elaborate proposed classification. Geiger conceives that some concept of a feeling element in affective consciousness similar to the useful sensation concept in intellectual consciousness must first be formulated. From this he thinks by proper elaboration one can construct a logical and at the same time a phenomenalistic classification of all kinds of feelings which will furnish the much-needed clarity to discussions, and offer direction for further investigations. This is an elaborate scheme, like many others of its kind which have been proposed. It is in principle and avowedly opposed to the James theory, and has apparently met with slight approval. It sounds too logical and schematic, perhaps.

Ribot, however, is apparently not interested in methodology quite so much for its own sake. He rather seeks to emphasize the unrecognized importance of affective life for psychology. The importance and the fruitfulness of more systematic psychological work with these affective factors of experience bring forth the treatise here in question. Those who have read his "La logique des sentiments,"

[1] "Essai sur les passions," Th. Ribot. Paris: Felix Alcan. Pp. vii + 192.

[2] Review of Geiger's "Bemerkungen zur Psychologie der Gefühlselemente und Gefühlsverbindungen," Vol. II., p. 101.

"La psychologie des sentiments," and particularly, in that it, too, is a somewhat specialized treatment, the "Essai sur l'imagination créatrice," will quickly recognize the general purpose of the "Essai sur les passions." Ribot does not construct nor is he interested in any purely logical or methodological scheme, nor does he follow James. He here selects from all manifestations of affective life those experiences which seem to have some pervasive organic reference, some genealogy in one's psychological growth, and some decisive function in developing striking personality. I shall report the work as a whole before adding further comment.

Ribot's purpose is (1) to fix upon with precision the characteristics of and the elements which constitute the "passions"; (2) to trace the primitive motor tendencies in which they originate, and to show how these changing varieties of movements parallel varieties of feelings; and (3) to discover how and why they issue in definite affective states. As in his study of the creative imagination, the author seeks to enlarge the circle of observation to include manifestations of feeling hitherto not included in general psychological treatises. Introspective observation and experimentation do not suffice for a psychology of the feelings.

Chapter I. Psychologists have in their treatises devoted comparatively little space to feelings, have conceived them as pathological affectations, have merely enumerated names in their classifications, have attempted to explain all by one law (Bain, James), have confounded feelings and emotions, have been contented to say that they can not be subjected to precise treatment, or have even often neglected them entirely.

Affective states proper, emotions, and passions must mark different types of mental states. Affections are feeble or moderate intensities of "appetites" inherent in our psychophysical organism, demands of nutrition or exercise of organs, or even esthetic or religious aspirations. Emotions are states aroused by some loss of equilibrium, sudden reaction or shock, such as anger, joy, or tenderness. Intensity and brevity are the attributes of such states. The passions are characterized, on the other hand, by their relative duration and stability. Here an idea or an image predominates, "la passion est une émotion prolongée et intellectualisée." The passions are hence states to be contrasted with the emotions, being both secondary, complex, and, to a certain extent, artificial, though also chronic rather than acute mental symptoms.

There are internal and external causes for the passions. The external are inversely proportionate in influence to the internal, the power of predisposition. Passions are chiefly latent, just as are the vocations of men which they later call forth. Other external

influences are imitation and suggestion. The internal influences, such as physiological constitution, individual temperament, or personal character, are the only true and profound causes of passions. The types seen are the sentimental, the passionate with one life passion (Mirabeau), or, again, those who possess one passion exalted, like a fixed idea in intellectual life, to the under-estimation of others.

The causes of passions are difficult to discover. They must not be explained by the unconscious or subconscious storing away of influences, except as to their origin. The three attributes pertaining peculiarly to a passion are its relations to the fixed idea, its duration, and its intensity. The author, citing great differences of opinion, is inclined to agree with Janet that the passion state rather than the fixed idea is the original controlling factor. In regard to its duration, we must not confuse impulsive emotions with passions, which latter endure for life or for years or for months, as the case may be. The intensity in passions is not always so evidently present as in emotional and appetitive states; it may be dynamic, as in an arrest of movements, energy resting in a state of tension. Impetuous desires, etc., of savages and children must not be confused with passions proper. This real passion aids both proper association and pertinent elimination, thus, by clarifying the dominant idea, further differentiating itself from other kinds of affective states. Further intellectual service it renders in stimulating all activities of creative imagination; when dynamic, by bringing forth expression in arts, poetry, etc.; when static, by finding expression in science, commerce, and mechanical arts. Indeed, "imagination est surtout affective." Likewise, there is in passion an intrinsical, inherent logical function, the "judgment of value." These passions can even be ramified into syllogisms, though it must be remembered that their rational is their incidental characteristic. This character is finality. Besides this all constructive reasoning, a creative faculty, is indirectly dependent upon passions. Likewise, volition in all its manifestations is related to existing passions: the impulsive, where the motor element is strong, to dynamic passions; the obstructed or arrested, where the intellectual element is prominent, to static or inhibitory passions. Love is generally of the first, ambition of the second, type of passions.

Chapter II. Here the genealogy of the passions in considered. There is no physiology of the passions which suffices to explain them. The James-Lange theory is overworked. Each passion proper has its own biological substratum. The progress of detailed work in finding physiological conditions for all sensational and intellectual activities is not paralleled by similar work on the passions. The conditions here are not simple. They affect the whole organism. Hunger (nutritive), sexual love (organic), the more intellectualized

love of money (the individual expansion or need of spontaneous activity) are typical passions. The nervous excitement which exercise alone can calm is the physiological condition. In whatever life activity impulsive outgo of muscular response obtains for one of the two kinds of passion, and arrest of movement for the other.

The four sources of origin, thus, in organic tendencies to action are:

1. Motor tendencies which preserve the individual.
2. Motor tendencies which preserve the species.
3. Those which contribute to the affirmation of one's feeling of personal power.
4. Those which are as various as the individuals whom they possess, such as the esthetic, scientific, or religious passions.

The passion for gormandizing, subject as all other psychic characteristics to the laws of recapitulation and of evolution, may be found in young or old, high or low life. In love, the manifestation of passion in the affective life, three stages can be distinguished, marking the steps in its complete evolution. These are the instinctive, the emotional, and the intellectualized.

The other two significant sources of origin are not so simple as the above organic and sexual activities. The tendency to individual expansion through the innate demand for activity arouses, through sympathy or conquest or destructive tendencies in turn, the passions first of pity, second of desire for the novel or difficult or dangerous (Columbus's passion), and third those of intrinsic, not accidental, destructive tendencies, of which last class antipathy is typical and fundamental.

Of the second group, joy as a passion, not as an impulsive emotion, has been neglected entirely by most authors. Joy comprises the desire for gain, the inclination to risk, the hope of some kind of individual profit, and the attraction toward the mysterious. Here the energy is dynamic, while in the passion of ambition or avarice, into which joy often develops, the state is in chief part that of potential energy in abeyance. Each passion has naturally different psychological constituents, the intellectual elements predominating in these latter examples.

The third class, passions of antipathy, should have emphasis equal in importance to that Adam Smith has ascribed to the first class, sympathetic passions. These develop from the organic, through the instinctive, to the temperamental proper, in which the passion of hate is engendered. It is physiologically made up of static tendencies to repulsion and of dynamic tendencies to destruction, each intermittently occupying the forefront. Anger is its crisis, and vengeance its final issue. Contrary to Bain, wrath is not the

genus of which hate is the species. Vengeance is not a passion, but the fulfillment of a passion. Likewise, jealousy is not a species of which hate is the genus. It has an entirely independent origin, based on the love of possession, and is composed of heterogeneous elements. Falsely so-called jealousies of animals and infants are merely discontinuous emotions. Passions develop only with the intelligence or consciousness of the objects and the end.

Chapter III. The rarer passions of which this chapter treats present more difficulty as to their genealogy because of their vaguer origin, their complexity, and their social and less personal character. These are the esthetic, the religious, and the political passions, and certain derived types which show peculiar, even freakish, deviations.

The esthetic passion, not to be confused with esthetic emotions, is a rare possession. Its source is in superfluous life activity. It is the classic grand passion. The esthetic activity has its own absolute freedom as its only end. This activity is most engrossing and superior to all others. This is why it so easily exhibits pathological symptoms. The passion for science is, on the other hand, the exclusive and essential passion for orientation in discovery. This passion is hence often static, showing inhibitory functions in operation; but in banishing traditional scientific or theological errors it becomes dynamic or combative.

The religious passion may be contemplative (individual), manifesting itself in mysticism or in asceticism, or it may be active (social), acting through persuasion or force. In mysticism it becomes a kind of Platonic love; in asceticism it is on the order of Spinoza's intellectual love, absorption in infinity, beatific vision. The active religious passions are more complex, made up of ardent altruistic tendencies "to save souls," of tendencies for fuller self-expansion, and of tendencies to brave all hazards, which last is similar to the passion of explorers. The combative religious temperament (Calvin) has no positive form. It implies the above tendencies in an unfortunate combination. In short, here as in all passion we have a concentration of psychophysical activities which oppose all ideas and temporary feelings which may in the several cases present obstacles.

The political type of passion, originating in the instinctive tendency to live in groups, tardy in appearance in the history either of individuals or of humanity, is a compound of personal ambition and social patriotism, above analyzed by the author. Here, as everywhere, Ribot is careful to eliminate the spasmodic, short-lived emotions; Carlyle's feeling in regard to the French Revolution, for example. Two real types can be distinguished, that of the realists and that of the idealists, the former being the more frequent.

This combines the passions of personal aggressiveness (*la volonté de puissance*) and those of ambition, sometimes, as in the case of Cromwell, directed toward an impersonal end. A fixed idea and tenacious energy characterize these tendencies. The passion of the political idealist is on the mystic order; never, as in the passions of love, avarice, and ambition, individual, but necessarily social and progressive to the point of sacrifice of individuals. It results in political suicide, dying of its own accelerated tendencies to progressive movement. These suicidal tendencies are illustrated in the patriotism passion, which, however, is simpler and entirely opposed to political passions proper, in that it is exempt from personal ambition. It is the social individual's gregariousness, originating in the social instinct for preservation of the body politic.

Besides these there are moral passions which must be transformed, to be efficacious, into religious ones. There are also smaller passions, smaller as to matter, but so fixed, so violent, that they really are grand passions. The passions of collectors of various types are here enumerated. These are governed by the tendency to accumulate exclusive possessions and to develop by exercise in activities as non-utilitarian as those which the esthetic passion exhibits. The origin of these freakish passions is obscured in the process of civilization making, a sort of by-product of the affective life, representing some combination of the passion of possession and the passion for esthetic expression.

Thus far the author has traced the general source or origin of the passions. He now faces the problem: Are there other sources of origin? Can an emotion produce a passion, as is so commonly asserted by psychologists? He thinks not. Emotions are unstable, passions are characterized by stability. A sudden state of anger does not make an irascible temperament, nor joy an optimist, nor sadness a melancholiac, nor does even the repetition of these emotional shocks; they rather do not exhibit the tendencies which engender passions and at most are only occasionally present at the same time. The irascible man is not the fighter, usually. Emotions represent acute crises, and can hence scarcely become chronic affective characteristics, though they may prove to be the first revelations of the more profound and chronic malady.

Chapter IV. Clearly, ambition does not develop as does love, nor avarice as fanatical political passions. The evolution of all, however, is slow, and the embryonic stages in subconscious and unconscious tendencies to action render their growth to fruition entirely unlike the sudden and temporary life of emotion. The passion is not a creation *ex nihilo*, nor any reaction to "fugitive phenomena." The passion is disengaged from the turbulent elements

which give rise to emotions, is more constitutional. The passion of maternal love illustrates this.

Passions may become extinct in different ways: by exhaustion through usage, by being transformed into another passion, by substitution, by insanity, or by death. The general rule for the ending of passions may thus be stated: "La probabilité d'extinction d'une passion est en raison directe de la quantité d'éléments émotionnels et en raison inverse de la quantité d'éléments intellectuels qu'elle contient à l'état systématisé." As a rule, the static passions, exhibiting more inhibitory tendencies, are more stable than the dynamic. They all change with the variations in the "fixed idea," which in turn is an indication, not a cause, of the change.

The first type of passion extinction depends upon weakened mentality and lessened excitability of the nervous system in old age. In emotions the excitability is diffuse and intermittent, while in the passions it is physiologically localized and psychologically specialized. They represent a condensation of the personality under a unique and preponderating form. A "siege of the passions," though in every case different, representing an aggregate of psychic units, has necessarily a physical and cerebral substratum, and a "localization and active coordination center whose synthetic unity is the passion." It seems probable that there is for them some continuity of central excitement, without which the stability and reappearance of the fixed idea could not be explained. After a while this continuous drainage can not be compensated for, and hence excitability, the condition for the existence of the passion, must disappear. Then ensues incapacity of nervous elements to act, just as they are also anesthetic. Apathy or even aversion may follow. Sexual love or the *secheressé* of the mystics may serve as illustrations. Further, habit may affect a superficial, but never a profound passion. This brooks no such obstacles. Religionists to the contrary, no sudden emotional shock can stop passions. They are of the fiber of individuality itself. Only a shock sufficient to affect such a change suffices to kill the passion.

Can they, then, be changed into other passions, our author asks, either by transformation or by substitution? The transformed passion is grafted on to the same source as the original which it displaces, human love into divine love, or sexual into Platonic, or men passionate for good into great criminals, etc. Two conditions, neither sufficient alone, together effect such changes, viz., a surplus of vital energy to dispense which requires orientation and a new directive idea. The original passion is the same under a different mask. Or, again, the original idea may remain and the tendency toward its object may become aversion instead of attraction, love

becomes hate, love of pleasure becomes asceticism, etc. All these represent a change in the judgment of value, not the more profound change in the underground passion.

Substitution, a replacement of a passion by one totally different in origin, is still rarer in occurrence. It is not sufficient to speak of the characteristic passions of childhood, youth, manhood, and old age as being cases in point. Passions, we have seen, must have had somehow their slow incubation period. Most cases of apparent substitution will not bear close scrutiny. The individual affective life itself, indeed, often exhibits not only different, but opposing and contradictory tendencies to action. Here the turbulent life of coexisting passions finds several different directions, such as we see in the life activities of Byron, Cæsar, Napoleon, and Rousseau. Here, indeed, the ruling passion at one time may for complicated psychological reasons give place to another ruling passion, which all the time, however, has been struggling in abeyance, not in any sense hence artificially grafted on to utilize surplus energy formerly directed elsewhere. Passions of this type are as little understood as they are rare, and afford a rich field for investigation.

As to passions of the next type, those that issue in madness, it is necessary to inquire, first, whether passions can be distinguished from pathological states, and what they have in common. As it is difficult to describe a normal body, so it is more difficult to describe a normal consciousness. The difficulty reaches its maximum when we attempt to speak of the normal affective life. Perfect adaptation of the individual to the conditions of his environment has been proposed as a test. Now passions have been criticized chiefly from a teleological point of view, and instincts from a mechanical. Passions exhibit errors, but instincts sin thus also. Considered entirely with reference to their plasticity to external environment, passions are more nearly related to insanity. But in relation to their invariable accompaniments, the fixed ideas, they are often useful; they create. Psychologically these states of mind are, unlike insanity, characterized by a consciousness of the possession of the passion. Neither do passions *per se* exhibit hallucinatory elements. In short, passions have no specific character which is never evident in insanity, but as in all so-called normality they must be judged "par un ensemble complexe de caractères." Students of mental pathology have not sufficiently distinguished passion and emotion symptoms. In any case the complete identification of passions and insanity is unacceptable. If they are maladies they should somehow appear in offspring. Their imperfect classification makes such investigations into heredity impossible as yet. Without experimental or statistical evidence it is probable that avarice or the passion for collecting might in later

generations appear as kleptomania. To decide further as to whether passion is *per se* morbid, one must inquire whether it is profitable for the individual, whether it enhances his ability for skillful and speedy adjustment to the world. What is its biological value? Its positive or negative biological value clearly depends upon one's view of life. It surely "polarizes consciousness," causes rupture with custom, and almost inevitably forms a partial character. It is, however, or may be, "anormal" without being pathological. One is possessed, but one is not insane. There is no absolute answer.

The last type of passion termination is in death itself. This fatal issue may come about in two ways, one where the passion leads to death without the accompanying clear realization of the fatal issue, as that of the glutton, or the artist, or the scholar; or where death as its consummation is fully realized, as in suicide, or open murder, or particularly the growing numbers of cases of double suicide of lovers, where gaiety characterizes even their gruesome preparation. It is so with ambition. Of the one hundred and nine imperial emperors of Rome only thirty-four died from natural causes.

The other type of passion terminating in death may be illustrated by the patriotism of soldiers, and the religious passions of martyrs and of missionaries. The passions here are impersonal and imperative. The idea at the bottom of these passion beliefs is social, "generalizable," entirely unlike those of the love passion, or the ambition, or the jealousy kind.

To summarize, the normal form of consciousness is to be diffuse, to exhibit various, numerous, and interrupted or discontinuous states; the condensed, concentrated, and simplified is the exception. The passion is the affective equivalent of attention and stable volition. The grand passions mark the culminating point in the life of feeling, the point of maximum energy, intensity, and permanence, irresistible in its effects. The geniuses in passion are even rarer than the intellectual geniuses. Let us also not forget that pure passions are composed of affective, motor, and intellectual elements, and that their importance must be measured by the functioning of these three factors, the union of which makes them powerful and constant. They appear and disappear from the focal affective stream just as do perceptions, images, and reasoning in the intellectual sphere. The passion, unlike the emotion, which is specific, is, from the point of view of evolution, individual. Individuality is itself a product of the activity of that form of imagination which owes its origin to a true passion. Unlike the emotion, too, the passion has its past and its future life, though these memories are necessarily not of things represented. They are further constituted

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by their own peculiar images, and for the most part are the work, not accidentally of nature, but spontaneously of man.

The work thus reported needs little comment. The author presents his material, which he has drawn from varied sources, pleasingly and with force. He is never dogmatic as to his classifications, never unreasoning in his criticism of others, and always bent upon making his steps clear. His great emphasis upon the fact that there is a law of passion, a need for clearer differentiation of differing affective states, a possibility for fruitful research in this aspect of conscious life, and a hint that feelings are not necessarily pathological, will be welcomed doubtless by all workers in this particular field.

His criticism of clinical pathology is suggestive, showing how vague and necessarily unworkable any present method of diagnosing affective disorders must be. This is but another means he adopts to emphasize the need for more intensive psychological work upon the feelings.

As some reviewers have already noted, and as all critical readers of his work will probably feel, Ribot has to a certain extent unwarrantably allowed a quantitative distinction to appear later in his discussion as a qualitative one. He marks off first passions as distinct by reason of their characteristic intensity, duration, and stability. He ends in having produced the impression upon the reader that qualitatively different phases of affective life are distinct. The men of passion are in a class to themselves. Passions to be "pure" must be freed from emotional aspects. Emotions must not even function in developing passions. Out of instincts and impulses they arise in their pure organized form. It would, perhaps, be nearer the truth and represent more consistently a strictly psychological and genetic point of view to consider all affection qualitatively in the same category, differing in the various manifestations only quantitatively. There can no more be a fixed demarcation line between the possessors of passion and those who do not have such feeling possibilities than there can be such a clear division of the geniuses and the moderately well equipped sane intellectual individuals. Perception or conception activities, however poorly chosen names for processes they may be, do not exhibit one law in the one and another kind of behavior in the other class. They develop from the spasmodic and ill-adapted to the more stable and organized mode of functioning. There seems to be a similar life for feelings. We "waste energy" in "emotional living" by disorganized action inevitably before concentrated and organized and "intellectualized" life of passion can be perfected. Ribot's remark that men of passion ordinarily are not hampered by frequent emo-

tional backsets, rather than proving that emotions and passions can be qualitatively distinguished, would seem to point to the more natural conclusion that poorly organized affective life has really developed into the more nearly perfected or pure type. This is criticism of a minor point, however, which is in no way intended to reflect upon the high character of the whole treatise. It may serve to call attention to the probable reason why many will not care to accept the particular genealogical structure of Ribot, while in the main agreeing with the author that there is one, and that this possibility offers a most fruitful and interesting field for investigation.

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THE THRESHOLD OF RECTIFIED PERCEPTION AS A CLINICAL TEST

SOME illusions which occur at the beginning of perceptions persist more or less constantly as long as the perceptions are continued or repeated, whereas others disappear after a time when greater familiarity has been had with the stimulus. In the latter cases, where the rectified perception becomes normal, the initial illusion may be wholly lost sight of and only by recourse to the untrained subject may the illusion be determined. Such a temporary illusion is the one described here, and the accompanying experimental results indicate a use which may be made of it in clinical tests.

The conditions of the experiment were these: the subject was seated at a table, pencil in hand and paper before him, and was told to observe a chart (see Fig.) which was about to be exposed, and upon its again being screened, to draw what he had seen. The exposure was of two seconds' duration, and the chart was eight feet from the subject's eye. If the subject had perceived the concentric circles as a spiral he was provided with fresh paper and a second exposure made. Thus the exposures were repeated until the subject perceived and drew the circles. The measure of the threshold of rectified perception is the number of exposures. The triangle is introduced into the figure in order to distribute the subject's attention.

Two other tests were made. The first of these was for facility in adding a column of eleven digits. The second was for facility in recalling that letter which, in alphabetical order, comes before each of seven given letters. The letters given were *g, p, s, u, i, b, o.*

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These controlled association and adding tests were given to all the subjects of the original experiment. The results are tabulated below,



The figure is two thirds the diameter of the original chart.

together with the combined college grades of the subjects, all of whom were my students, for the preceding two months.

TABLE

Subject.	Exposures in 1st test.	Adding. sec.	Association. sec.	College grade. Per cent.
1	4	14	60	72
2	8	11	67	83
3	10	13	43	87
4	1	16	18	82
5	3	7	35	89
6	1	20	20	89
7	4	17	85	90
8	1	7	15	91

If the subjects are divided into group one, those who perceived the circles as such at the first exposure, and group two, those who perceived the circles as a spiral, we find no direct correlation between the results of the adding test and the results of the illusion test in the two groups. But the results of the association test show a marked positive correlation with those of the illusion test. The average time in the association test was, for group one, 17.6 seconds, average variation 1.8 seconds; and for group two, 58 seconds, average variation 15.2 seconds. The average college grades are, for group one, 87.3, average variation 3.4; and for group two, 84.2, average variation 5.4.

If a clinical use is made of such an illusion as this to determine the threshold of rectified perception, some better arrangement of the figure may be found, and the conditions should be corrected for abnormal vision. My own subjects all responded normally, showing little variation *inter se*, to the Snellen alphabet vision tests.

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DISCUSSION

CONSCIOUSNESS AND RELATIVITY—A REPLY TO PROFESSOR BODE

IN an article on "The Problem of Objectivity"[1] Professor Bode has been good enough to submit a criticism of my paper on "Contemporary Realism and the Problems of Perception."[2]

In the present paper I shall attempt to answer several of the more trenchant objections urged by my critic.

1. I find myself unable to appreciate the cogency, or even the meaning, of Professor Bode's first objection (pp. 151–152), which is to the effect that the realist in admitting that some objects may exist independently of consciousness is logically compelled to admit that all objects, even feelings and emotions, may enjoy a similar independence, and I pass it by the more readily because of the critic's acknowledgment that if consciousness itself could be proved to him to be something truly objective, his objection would cease to apply.

2. But consciousness, Professor Bode continues, can not be anything objective, and, more particularly, it can not be the form of potential energy with which I have identified it, because "quality plus a form of potential energy can be regarded as equivalent to sensation only on condition that the potential energy be found identical with some element actually present in the sensation. . . . Analysis seems able to discover but one element besides the quality, viz., our old friend abstract awareness" (p. 152). To reply adequately to this objection it would be necessary to state once more all of the striking resemblances between what from without and inferentially is described as potential energy and what from within is directly known as sensation. I must content myself with reminding Professor Bode of only three of these resemblances: First, in addition to the quality and the awareness which he finds in sensation, there is *intensity*, which for some reason Professor Bode completely overlooks; and as the intensity of a sensation bears a relatively constant relation to the intensity of the stimulus, it looks as though there was something of the same identity between intensity of stimulus and intensity of sensation as that between the intensity of the velocity of a moving object and the intensity of the stress into which that velocity is transformed when the moving object collides with a fixed elastic obstacle. Again, the relation between

[1] This JOURNAL, Vol. V., p. 150.
[2] This JOURNAL, Vol. IV., p. 374.

intensity of effort and intensity of the resulting muscular movements bears a curious resemblance to the relation between the intensity of stress in a bow and the intensity of the velocity with which the arrow leaves the bow. Second, in addition to the intensity factor which sensations and stresses possess in common with one another and in common with the kinetic energies which are their causes and effects, there is the attribute of polarity, or subject-object duality, which is one of the most notable *differentiæ* of even the simplest psychical states. It is interesting to note that when kinetic energy passes into a potential condition of stress a quite analogous duality or polarity overtakes it. For forces always exist in couples. A stress never stays a stress except so long as it is balanced by an equal and opposite stress. And just as it would be impossible to have a subject without an object, an awareness that was not an awareness of something, so would it be equally impossible to have a stress continue unbalanced by an opposite stress. Third, the times and conditions in which a sensation occurs happen also to be the times and conditions in which the kinetic energy of a neural current is, at the moment of its redirection, transformed into potential energy. Now these three resemblances may not be sufficient in themselves to prove the hypothesis that sensation and potential energy are identical, but they should certainly not be passed over in complete silence by one who undertakes to criticize that hypothesis.

3. I am afraid that I do not understand the purport of Professor Bode's final criticism of my conception of consciousness (pp. 153–154), except in so far as it may be summed up in the following passage: "We are apparently confronted with a new form of the old problem of how from various units or fragments to constitute the concrete unity of our conscious life" (p. 154). To this I would reply that the identification of the field of consciousness with the field of potential energy set up in the nerve centers[3] of the brain seems to me to provide an excellent basis for understanding the peculiar unity which pervades and dominates the manifoldness of a psychosis. The self conceived as a system of interconnected stresses is as unlike as possible to Hume's disconnected "bundle of perception" with which Professor Bode compares it. The different elements of such a system of stresses bear the same indissoluble relations to one another, and consequently exhibit the same indivisible unity, which consciousness reveals to itself. Hence, I can see in this connection, not an objection, but only a further reason in favor of the identification of the two types of system.

[3] I need hardly remind the reader that "move center" (occurring in Professor Bode's quotation from my article) is a misprint for "nerve center."

The last part of Professor Bode's paper is a criticism of the doctrine that physical objects owe all their properties to their relations to one another and to the entire cosmic system of which they are members. Of the several acute objections which Professor Bode brings against this conception, I select for discussion the two following:

(1) "If," writes Professor Bode (p. 155), "a given object is 'in itself' simply the resultant of its appearances from all possible view-points, then the judgment that it is 'really' square signifies that squareness is the particular appearance which harmonizes all the divergent perceptions as to its shape. . . . Since, however, the apparent shapes of every object are literally innumerable, there seems to be no particular reason why different standards should not be employed by different persons or by the same person at different times . . . so far as knowing goes, we seem to be forced back to the view that the nature of the object is indeterminate, that it can be all things to all men, and that truth and error is a meaningless distinction." Taking these points in the reverse order to that in which they are presented, I answer first, that error consists always in taking as a universal something that is true only as a particular. Yonder object is truly an ellipse in its relation to my present position in space. I err when I assume that it is similarly elliptical with reference to all other points of view. Secondly, the seemingly indeterminate and self-contradictory nature of objects, which Professor Bode believes to be a result of my conception, vanishes when we remember that diverse and opposite properties of objects pertain to them only with respect to the diverse and opposite relations in which they stand. The same object can be hot to me and cold to you, square to me and oblong to you, without any contradiction or indeterminateness. What kind of an object would it be, forsooth, which remained completely unaltered by the relations in which it stood? An object is not all things to all men, but rather is it a somewhat different thing to each different man. Its true and entire nature consists of the totality of its various aspects properly discriminated from one another. Of what else could it consist, and how otherwise could we know it? Thirdly, as to the reason why we pick out some one of the aspects of an object as a more real, or a more intimate and intrinsic, part of its nature than other aspects—it is much the same reason as that which leads us to take the mean of a number of observations or measurements—being most nearly harmonious with all of them it is least likely to be due to the peculiarities of any one of them.

(2) The second of the two principal objections of Professor Bode to the theory of relativity he expresses as follows: "If from a given

view-point the object appears to an observer to have a certain quality, what happens to the object when the observer leaves his post and thereby reduces the latter to a mere possible view-point?'' (p. 156). I should answer that such qualities as were contributed to the object by the observer *out of his own nature* would vanish when he ceased to perceive the object, while those qualities which had come from the object to the observer and which he had *merely reflected* back to their source would remain. The same sort of problem would arise if we were to look at the landscape through a bit of colored glass, and then remove the glass. The features which the landscape owed to the glass it would cease to have, while those other qualities which the glass merely transmitted and did not confer, would remain. The latter would be more real because more permanent, but the former qualities would have really pertained to the landscape during the time when it was observed through the glass. The determination of the various methods for eliminating the personal equation and introducing harmony and compossibility into the vast concourse of physical qualities presented to us by nature is the business of common sense supplemented by the several sciences.

In conclusion, I can not help reminding Professor Bode that neither the relativity of natural objects nor the relativity of human knowledge is a result of my hypothesis. They had their being before the hypothesis was formed. And so while I agree with my critic that a universe of relativity is in many respects very unsatisfactory, and that in such a universe it is a matter of great difficulty to discover the real and absolute nature of things, I must decline to believe that that difficulty is in any wise aggravated by calling attention to its existence.

W. P. MONTAGUE.

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.

SOCIETIES

SECTION OF ANTHROPOLOGY AND PSYCHOLOGY OF THE NEW YORK ACADEMY OF SCIENCES

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY

A MEETING was held in conjunction with the New York Branch of the American Psychological Association on February 24, 1908. The usual afternoon session was adjourned to hear a lecture by Professor Titchener, at Columbia University, on ''The Laws of Attention,'' in which he discussed the question as to the number

of distinguishable levels of clearness which are simultaneously present in the same consciousness. After a comprehensive review of the literature and a careful examination of the doctrines which hold to three or four levels, the lecturer concluded that there was no real evidence of more than two distinct levels, that of clearness, or attention, and that of obscurity, or inattention. For example, in looking at one of the common puzzle pictures, in which a face is concealed, the moment the face appears to the observer the picture as a whole, which up to that moment had been clear, drops at once into obscurity, and there is no appearance of a gradual fading into obscurity through a series of intermediate gradations. It is true, however, that both at the level of obscurity and, more certainly still, at the level of clearness there may exist slight differences in the prominence of the different elements present. This is illustrated by the differing prominence of the different elements of a rhythm, even though all lie in the field of attention. There may also, as between different states of consciousness, be differences in the level of clearness and in that of obscurity; the narrower the field of attention, the greater is the disparity between the level of clearness and the level of obscurity.

An evening session was held at the American Museum of Natural History, at which the following communications were presented:

Professor H. C. Warren, in discussing "Feeling and Other Sensations," said that the supposed radical distinction between feeling and sensation was supported by three separate claims. (1) *Evidence from introspection.* This is inconclusive. Admitting the vast difference of sort between so-called feelings and visual sensations (*e. g.*), there appears quite as vast a difference of sort between visual, auditory, and other "external" sensations. (2) *Distinction between external and internal elements.* This affords no better criterion. The hedonic tone of a visual sensation (*e. g.*) has just as definite a physical basis as its brightness or color characters. Organic conditions are less clear-cut than external stimuli, but difference in *degree* of clearness is no reason for dividing experience into two elemental *sorts.* Moreover, a distinction based on source should recognize activity experience also. The speaker prefers the terms external, organic, and kinesthetic sensations to a more radical division into sensations, feelings, and activity experiences. (3) *Different genetic roles of presentation and affection.* "External" sensations lead more readily to thought and "knowledge about" things than internal. But this is due to the relative vagueness of the latter. Definite, vivid experiences lead to perception, judgment, reasoning; indefinite, vague experiences lead to nothing be-

yond themselves. Yet any experience, even of discomfort or well-being, may at times become focused in attention and form the basis of a judgment. The distinction between presentative and affective is, therefore, not really based on the nature of stimuli. Intellectual experience is the result of a distinctive mental function which acts (in favorable circumstances) on sensory experiences of any sort.— The three claims for a radical dichotomy of experience are thus found to be unsatisfactory. All simple experience is essentially one in nature.

Mr. Warner Brown reported on his experimental study of "Time in Verse." A large number of graphic records of the voice were made the basis of the report. The material embraced nonsense verses and typical verses of English poetry. The former failed to show any differences of *tempo* between the four common rhythms, and the differences of internal time relations of the feet were not found to be those usually accepted. Syllables in trochees are nearly equal in length, but the accented is shorter. The accented syllable of the dactyl is not longer than the corresponding short syllable of the anapest. If two short syllables are taken as equivalent to one, no sharp line can be drawn between two-syllable and three-syllable rhythms in respect to time. In lines of poetry the conventional alternation of long and short syllables is frequently reversed, leaving the time structure chaotic. The feet approximate equality only in the very simplest verse. There is no regular connection between accent and duration. None of the three-syllable rhythms took the form given by the dactyl in nonsense verse. The general conclusion was that the ear is incompetent to judge, and that the impression of temporal regularity in verse is strictly illusory.

Mr. H. L. Hollingworth reported an experimental study of "The Time of Movement." This report described an instrument designed to record simultaneously and graphically the extent, duration, and force of a rectilinear arm movement. To the car of the Cattell-Fullerton extent of movement apparatus is attached a signal magnet, which controls the vibrations of an enlarged Pfeil time marker. On a smoked paper, stretched on a horizontal frame, the writing point traces the extent of the movement and records the time in twentieths of a second. The interruptions are made by means of a reed oscillator. The car pulls against a set of springs, which are adjustable, so that the force may be varied independently of the extent, but correlated with it empirically. A pulley attachment provides for the use of weights instead of springs. The traditional method of controlling the extent of a movement by impact against an upright is found to cause a large positive constant error

which is a function of the force of impact, and the magnitude of which increases the variable error. When the movement was blocked at one centimeter from the starting-point, the varying speeds, indicated in mm. per tenth of a second, gave the following results:

Speed	68	100	110
Constant error	+ 138 mm.	+ 174 mm.	+ 171 mm.
Variable error	30 "	42 "	41 "

When stopped at two centimeters:

Speed	32	120	138
Constant error	+ 100 mm.	+ 158 mm.	+ 166 mm.
Variable error	24 "	38 "	32 "

When stopped at three centimeters:

Speed	103	155
Constant error	+ 90 mm.	+ 132 mm.
Variable error	24 "	28 "

In order to eliminate this factor a sound hammer, introduced at optional points along the track, serves as a signal for stopping the movement. The movement is thus terminated by the subject himself and becomes a unit, commensurable with any other free movement.

Dr. Adolf Meyer, in discussing "The Concept of Substitutive Activity and the Relation of Mental Reaction Types to Psychiatric Nosology," noted as a characteristic sign of our times in psychopathology, as in other biological and extrabiological domains, the surrender of the quest for the final nature of events in terms of physicochemical materialism. The chase for the noumenon, or *Ding an sich,* has lost its charm. We realize that much of what is expressed in psychology or psychopathology in terms of nerve-cells is pseudo-scientific tautology, the facts on which the claims are based being extraneurological, and the inferences being often enough not only unverifiable, but directly opposed by what we know in terms of nerve histology and nerve physiology. This form of scientific mythology serves its purpose if it stimulates, but it ought not to be accepted as solution. It seems infinitely wiser to reduce events not to static principles, but to *simpler events,* and to study the laws of modifiability of the active factors and of the results. The notion of the "lesion" is helpful where facts are accessible; otherwise, it plays the role of a noumenon. Events are defined by the situation, the reaction, and the final adjustment, and the role played by parts of the event or parts of the mechanism. Abnormal events may be best accounted for by modification either of infrapsychical (simple physiological) or of mental (physiological-psychological) factors. Since the mental events constitute adjustive actions with a scale of effi-

ciency or lack of efficiency, we can distinguish the well-planned act, poorly supported by faulty physiological mechanisms, from inadequately *planned,* inferior reactions; and the latter we designate as substitutive activities, to denote that the fault lies more in the deficiency of the mental adaptation itself than in that of the tool of the same. The advantage lies in the fact that we do not telescope the facts into a schematic artifact devoid of a time component, with a craving for uncontrollable nerve-cell notions, but our attention remains faithful to the field in which things happen. The tendency of an overbelief in the value of noumena is further illustrated in the notion of a "disease," as soon as it figures as more than an empirical unit, satisfying the identification of certain combinations of manifestations, or of some issues of treatment, or not infrequently of a desire for protection against demands of responsibility concerning the outcome. The "disease" notion is hardly conspicuous in the plainest events of pathology, in injuries, intoxications, and even infection, but the nearer we get to the ill-defined, the more the term "disease entity" gets a noumenal overimportance. Consumption used to be a protective term covering up the inefficiency of management of tubercular infection; *dementia præcox* is to-day such a term covering up medical inefficiency in dealing with the so-called deterioration processes. Within their proper field and plainly realized limitations, the maintenance of these noumena has a great advantage for orderly thinking, but, like the neo-vitalistic modes of presentation of biological facts, they would be most detrimental if considered as more than formulas or starting-points of more fundamental work. For didactic and practical work the differentiation of unfavorable developments from harmless or from constitutional recurrent, but non-deteriorating, disorders is equally important for the physician and for the families. Hence the importance of a distinction of *dementia præcox* and manic-depressive insanity. But for progress in the understanding, a constructive knowledge of events has to supersede the purely formal method of what can only be a preliminary grouping, until the pertinent cases can be said to present experiments of nature with clearly known components, traced to simpler events rather than to artificial elements of psychology or neurology.

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Secretary.

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REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

The Ethical Significance of Feeling, Pleasure, and Happiness in Modern Non-Hedonistic Systems. WILLIAM KELLY WRIGHT. *Philosophic Studies of the University of Chicago,* No. 1. Pp. 95.

I. *Introduction.* "During the Middles Ages," Dr. Wright says, "such a question as what significance should be attributed to pleasure in a moral system could hardly have arisen. . . . Pleasure in the modern sense of the term could hardly have been regarded as of much moral value, even if it were not reprobated as indissolubly bound up with the world, the flesh, and the devil." But the Renaissance philosophy was more hospitable to the conception of pleasure; and it is the author's task to trace the function of pleasure, feeling, and happiness in the ethical systems of certain non-hedonists of modern times.

II. *The Perfectionists* (pp. 9–29), Descartes, Malebranche, Spinoza, Leibniz, Wolff, are the first group to be considered. For this whole school "perfection" was the highest good. "Happiness is 'the consciousness of all the perfection of which we are capable.' It is consciousness of perfection *as a whole,* and is *permanent.* Pleasure is consciousness of *a* perfection; it is *finite, particular, transient.*" Descartes held that pleasure furnishes the initial spring to action, but that perfection is the end of action. "He thought that in attaining individual perfection a person is obtaining the most pleasure and happiness possible, and at the same time performing his duty." For "the difficulties involved in the combination of pleasure, happiness, and virtue under the conception of perfection have not yet become apparent." Malebranche dwelt more upon the spiritual aspect of perfection, but, like Descartes, he thought that pleasure and duty could be united in the concept of perfection. Spinoza said that there was nothing unique about feeling, that it was distinguished from thought only by being confused—pure thought being clear and distinct. Pleasure and feeling he regarded as valuable guides to action in the attainment of perfection, but perfection, once attained, must be purely intellectual (or rather cognitive) in character. Leibniz regarded happiness as "an active and progressive state in which new degrees of perfection are constantly being attained." With Descartes, but unlike Spinoza, he recognized intellectual pleasures. Wolff, again, reduced pleasure to confused cognition, and opposed it to the rational character of perfection. The reward of perfection, however, consisted for him in happiness composed of pleasures. The difficulty of coordinating pleasure with perfection becomes quite apparent in Wolff.

III. *The British Non-Hedonists* (pp. 30–52) are the second group to be dealt with. The British school perceived more clearly than the continental writers the difficulty of engaging pleasure as the handmaid of virtue. It was an important contribution that they should have defined this problem more clearly than did their predecessors. Two lines of solution were proposed. (1) It was admitted that no human being will follow the good unless he finds some happiness in doing so. The con-

ception of pleasure (happiness meant to the British writers a sum of pleasures) was, therefore, widened so as to include the pleasures of sympathy, benevolence, and the moral sense. Philosophers of this stripe were Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Hartley, Hume, Adam Smith. (2) Another class, including Butler, Price, Reid, Dugald Stewart, Thomas Brown, reject self-love or the desire for happiness as the only impelling power to right action. They dwell upon other impulses and tend to give pleasure a subordinate place, the later ones teaching that the moral sense is due to original constitution, and that moral judgment is intuitive.

IV. *Modified Perfectionism* (pp. 52–56) is taken up in this section in the theories of Mendelssohn, Tetens, and Schmidt. These writers all devote themselves to the psychological study of feelings and sensations, and place more emphasis on the function of feeling than had been done by the first perfectionists.

V. *Kant* (pp. 57–71). Kant, in working out his doctrine of the categorical imperative, had these two problems to face. "(1) How is a purely rational morality to secure its motivation by the sensible, affective nature of man, and so be carried out in action? (2) What is to be the relation of happiness to the attainment of such a morality?" "Kant answered the first problem by securing the motivation of duty through the pleasures and pains of reverence and interest in the moral law. He answered the second by making a happiness composed of pleasures a necessary ethical postulate, and a constituent in the complete good."

VI. *Several Nineteenth-Century Non-Hedonists* (pp. 72–91). With Fichte, who emphasized so much the fulfillment of duty as the central point in his system, two kinds of pleasure, happiness, and impulse are found, the good and the bad. Happiness does not, therefore, mean to him a totality of pleasures. Hegel, for whom the attainment of rationality and freedom was a gradual process, taught that pleasures and pains were guides to action only in the earlier stages of that process. Schopenhauer, like Leibniz, Kant, Fichte, and Hegel, accepted the Platonic definition of pleasure as being the cessation of pain or discomfort. He worked out the pessimistic conclusion which logically belongs with this assumption. (It is not quite apparent to the reviewer why Schopenhauer is classed as a non-hedonist; for if life can be condemned solely on the ground that its pains outweigh its pleasures, this would seem to be a recognition of pleasure as the highest good.) Herbart: "Pleasure, in Herbart's psychology, is due to the harmonious cooperation of the different ideas, and pain to their disagreement. . . . Such pleasures and pains are often empirical, and involve no *a priori* principles. Consequently, a happiness composed of pleasures merely, without further specification, would not be a proper end of morality." A morality, however, which is based upon the feeling of the beautiful does have the universality and objectivity necessary for a moral end. Lotze teaches: "Sensuous feelings have regard only to the well-being of the individual person experiencing them. Ethical and esthetic feelings, on the other hand, are expressions of the furtherance or disturbance of the universal spirit in us. . . . The highest good is accordingly happiness, or, better, blessedness,

taken in this concrete sense, and recognized as involving the happiness of the universe as a whole, and not our own happiness apart from this, but as included in it." For Green, "The unity which is given to feeling in self-consciousness alters the character of desire completely. In the animal state desire is for immediate pleasant feeling. In the human state, on the other hand, desire is for objects. In the attainment of these objects it is thought that a certain self-satisfaction will be found. But the objects are not desired—or at least the chief incentive in any desire is not for any enjoyable feeling tone that attends the attainment of the object." Green thinks it impossible that pleasure could be the principal aim of a self-conscious being. Nietzsche regards the "will for power" as the only final value, and he holds that this furnishes the motive to action. Pleasure and pain accompany action, but are never the motives for it, nor the ends.

VII. The conclusion states that neither of Kant's problems has been wholly solved, though each of the philosophers discussed has contributed somewhat toward the solution of one or the other.

Dr. Wright's treatise is too full of material to be adequately reviewed in a few pages, and the above account does not do justice to his clearness and continuity. He has given a concise and careful statement of the growth of an ethical problem and of various proposed solutions. Though primarily ethical in its scope, this essay, in the attention it gives to the definition of pleasure, becomes a valuable contribution to the history of psychology as well as to the field of ethics.

WINNEBAGO, WISCONSIN. KATE GORDON.

The Conception of Possibility. R. F. ALFRED HOERNLÉ. *International Journal of Ethics,* Vol. XVIII., No. 1, October, 1907. Pp. 25–43.

When we regard alternatives in conduct as possible, we do not mean that if our knowledge were complete we should know before decision how we were going to decide. Theoretical possibility does imply incompleteness of knowledge; but possibility in volitional experience implies the notion of tendency or realization in the thing known.

The theoretical assertion "glass is brittle" implies the possibility that glass will break. If we enumerate all the conditions required for the breaking of glass, we may say that glass of a given composition, under a certain pressure, *must* break. If *A*, then *B*, necessarily. But this necessity is only "ideal." The inexhaustible complexity of the "real" makes it uncertain whether *A* in fact exists, in any particular case. In particular cases we can only say that *B* is possible, or that it is *more* possible. This assertion of possibility is a confession of ignorance, an ignorance not to be eliminated.

The concept of the future also implies, however, possibility of another stamp. Suppose all the conditions, *A*, to be present. *B* then is not actual, but possible. Its possibility and its necessity alike result from *A*. Because *A* is present, *B* is not, but is to be present. Here, says Mr. Hoernlé, we introduce surreptitiously the dynamic concept of tendency. This "real" possibility implies not only that all the conditions,

A, are present which make *B* realizable, possible, but also that there is a tendency, a power, force or life in *A* which brings *B* on the scene. This tendency can not be included among present conditions, for if *all* the conditions of *B* were present, there is no reason why *B* should not be present now just as much as ever it will be.

Determinism conceives the process of realization as a succession of events in which the present and real condition the future. But the fact that the future is future requires that all its conditions are not present. Hence the recognition of processes of realization forbids the assumption of determinism, and leaves open the question of genuine alternatives. This was evident as soon as we made explicit the notion of tendency latent in our conception of such processes. Volition is the consciousness of tendency; so that we may conclude that it admits the concept of possibility both in the sense in which it is opposed to actuality, and in the sense in which it is opposed to determinism.

To the argument offered by determinism that volitional tendencies are conditioned by character, or by self, inasmuch as the decision in any given case could not have been other than it was without supposing the self or character to have been other than it was,—to this Mr. Hoernlé answers that the self and the character are themselves affected by the realization of the tendency, and are not wholly contained in the antecedent conditions of the decision. Action makes or determines the character and the self, as truly as it is conditioned by them. The self is dynamic, tendential.

Granting that the genuineness of alternatives is thus far problematical, only, and an open question, Mr. Hoernlé then brings into the field the testimony of consciousness, both at the moment of consciousness and in the sense of self-reproach. He maintains that there is now no reason to regard this testimony as illusory. He also notes that self-reproach suggests the position that the good was possible, even where it has not been realized, though here, at least, the presence of alternatives is due to the groundless, irrational character of evil.

Does not Mr. Hoernlé neglect in this argument the consideration that necessity and the denial of genuine alternatives lurk in the conception of tendency as possessing a *direction* which can not be changed except through an external cause? This consideration applies to motion in space, without apparent contradiction. It is what is really meant in the appeal to self-determinism. The self is conceived as having not only present existence, but direction, through which the process of realization is determined. This concept of inertia may be strictly applicable only to motion in space; but that this is so has not been shown, I believe. We speak of mental inertia, whether of stability or of change.

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JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS

ARCHIV FÜR SYSTEMATISCHE PHILOSOPHIE. February, 1908, Bd. XIV., Heft 1. *Der Pragmatismus* (pp. 1–10): L. STEIN. – A brilliant summary of the situation upon which James's book appeared, introductory to a criticism to follow upon the book itself. *Naturwissenschaft und Wirklichkeitserkenntnis* (pp. 10–24): M. FRISCHEISEN-KÖHLER. – The question of atoms, ions, etc., is as much concerned with concrete existence as is the corresponding investigations into the existence of double, and dark, stars, or, indeed, of any body whatsoever. *Religion und Lebensgenuss* (pp. 24–31): D. M. MEYER. – Love is the means to, and the consummation of, happiness; religion is the true path to this end. *Grundzüge einer Sozialaristokratie* (pp. 31–57): F. SOMMER. – Social betterment depends upon the differentiation of people into the fundamental types, which here are defined; this differentiation awaits the freeing of marriage from other motives than those of personal attraction, and the restoration of the family to its place as an educational force. *Studien zur Wertaxiomatik* (pp. 58–94): T. LESSING. – In place of the psychological (Hume), the positivistic (evolutionary), and the metaphysical (Kantian) bases of ethical theory, is proposed what may be called a logical approach to its problems, in which worths are distinguished fundamentally according as they may be regarded as means or as ultimate, not as highest, ends. *Die Räumlichkeit als objectiver Empfindungsverband* (pp. 94–116): P. SCHWARTZKOPFF. – A psychological treatise on the development of the idea of space through the senses of sight and touch. *Jahresbericht über die Literatur zur Metaphysik* (pp. 117–134): D. KOIGEN. – This issue is devoted to nature philosophy, as exemplified, on the one hand, in T. Lipps, "*Philosophie im Beginne des XX Jahrhunderts,*" the critical development, "more Kantian than Kant"; and, on the other, by W. Ostwald's "*Systematische Philosophie,*" concrete and relativistic, of service in unifying scientific concepts, but contrary to the spirit of German philosophy in putting aside the problem of the world's totality. *Die neuesten Erscheinungen. Systematische Abhandlungen in den Zeitschriften. Eingegangene Bücher.*

Balfour, A. J. *Decadence.* Henry Sidgwick memorial lecture. Cambridge: The University Press. 1908. Pp. 62. 1s. 6d. *net.*

Bayet, Albert. *L'idée de bien.* Essai sur le principe de l'art moral et rational. Paris: Felix Alcan. 1908. Pp. 233. 3.75 fr.

Butler, Nicholas Murray. *Philosophy.* A lecture delivered at Columbia University in the series on science, philosophy, and art, March 4, 1908. New York: The Columbia University Press. 1908. Pp. 27. 25 cents.

George Washington University Bulletin. Department of medicine number, Vol. VI., No. 4, 1907. This number contains, among other articles, the following: Psychology and the Medical School, by Shep-

herd Ivory Franz; Reflex Neurosis with Particular Reference to Eyestrain, by D. Kerfoot Shute; The Philosophical Foundations of Charlatanry in Medicine, by D. Kerfoot Shute.

Schmidt, Eugen Heinrich. *Kritik der Philosophie vom Standpunkt der intuitiven Erkenntnis.* Leipzig: Fritz Eckardt. 1908. Pp. viii + 507. 8.50 M.

NOTES AND NEWS

To the Editors of the Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods

Gentlemen: As a student for many years of a subject now called significs, dealing with the possibilities as well as defects in the accepted forms and significance of expression, may I ask leave to say a few words on Mr. Rutgers Marshall's letter in your issue of February 13th?

It is always refreshing to see such an appeal made from a distinguished quarter for consensus on sorely needed rectifications of sporadic and inconsistent usage, especially in psychology, the subject which more nearly than any other concerns us all. Having noted a vast number of cases in which words like "consciousness" and "awareness" are used apparently at the fancy and discretion of each writer, I would venture to suggest that awareness should retain some flavor of its original sense of an extension of that *wariness*—once needfully prominent—which is the primitive and still operative preparation for defensive or protective action.

We have to remember, also, that while "unconscious" from shock or anesthetic, our psychic existence persists through complete *insensibility*. This word again introduces another and important element. As its converse is sensibility or sensitiveness, it is here, perhaps, that care is especially needed, since it should keep closely drawn the link between consciousness, awareness, and sensation, which last belongs to one of the richest and most variously suggestive of our ideas—that of sense.

There is, of course, much more to say which, as far as I know, has not yet been said, on a theme like this; but I must not encroach further on your space.

Yours faithfully,

V. Welby.

Duneaves, Harrow, England,
February 24, 1908.

The following summary of the address of the outgoing president of the Anthropological Institute, Professor Cunningham, on "Anthropology in the Eighteenth Century," is from the *Athenæum* of February 8. Anthropology in the period discussed was identified primarily with the names of five men, Camper, White, Blumenbach, Prichard, and Lawrence. "Camper, although his strictly anthropological work consisted of only four papers, yet had an immense influence on the science. It is especially noteworthy that Camper's inclinations at first turned towards

art, and that it was due to this fact that he invented the facial angle, which, in spite of severe criticism, had until a comparatively recent period a great influence on craniometrical methods. White, a Manchester physician, had been spoken of as the father of anthropometry, and in a sense this title is not altogether undeserved, as he appears to have been the first to make in a rational and scientific manner measurements of the living person. But his chief title to fame lies in his discovery that the forearm of the negro, relatively to the upper arm, is longer than that of the European, and a corresponding relationship exists between the ape and the negro. From these observations of White's most interesting facts have accrued. To Blumenbach is due in great part the foundation of modern anthropology. His knowledge was remarkable, and his work on 'The Natural Variety of Mankind' of the first importance. He divided mankind into five varieties under one species, and his classification rested on a rational basis, as he placed reliance on color, hair, and bodily structure, especially the form of the skull. Although not the first to study this part of the skeleton, he was the first to do so scientifically, and he must always be regarded, therefore, as the founder of craniology, and his influence on this subject can be felt at the present day. By many people Prichard has been considered as the greatest anthropologist of his age. An accomplished anatomist, he was also a learned philologist and a noted psychologist, and he brought his wide knowledge of these subjects to bear upon his ethnological work. In his famous book 'Researches into the Physical History of Mankind' he maintained, like Camper and Blumenbach, that the races of man should be included under one species. He also held interesting views on the subject of skin color, being of opinion that the original pair from whom mankind has sprung were black. The last of the great anthropologists with whom Professor Cunningham dealt was Sir William Lawrence. At the age of thirty-two he delivered his famous lectures on comparative anatomy, which raised a storm of protest, and were so strongly denounced as 'propagating opinions detrimental to society' that he withdrew them, and with their withdrawal his anthropological work ceased. But his lectures are still read, as they possess great scientific value. His facts were doubtless largely borrowed from Blumenbach, but he handled them in a more illuminating way and showed a deeper insight into their morphological significance. He denied, as did Prichard, the doctrine of the transmissibility of acquired characters, and to a certain extent anticipated the modern doctrine of evolution. His loss to anthropology was great, as had he continued his work he would have contributed much to the progress of the science."

Nature of February 1 mentions as follows the new French ethnographical review, *Revue des Études ethnographiques et sociologiques*, which, " under the editorship of M. A. van Gennep, starts its career in the number for last month with an excellent program. Dr. J. G. Frazer contributes a chapter from the new forthcoming edition of the 'Golden Bough' on 'St. George and the Palilia.' The Palilia is a Roman spring

agricultural feast, at which the herdsman used to make a sacrifice to Pales and invoke his protection for the flocks, praying him to grant rain for the pastures and to protect the cattle from wolves. In Esthonia, about the same time of the year, a feast is held in honor of St. George, who grants fertility to women and flocks. In eastern Europe the saint seems to represent the old spring god of the Lithuanians, Pergrubius, and, further east, Tammuz or Adonis. With his wide knowledge of peasant rites and ceremonies, Dr. Frazer has no difficulty in establishing the connection between these varied cults of agricultural and pastoral life. This paper is followed by an elaborate sketch by M. M. Delafosse of the Siena or Senoufo tribe, who inhabit the French territory in West Africa in the region adjoining the British Ashanti frontier. M. C. Boreux discusses the decorated pottery of predynastic Egypt. Some reviews and a bibliography complete a publication which promises to be of considerable value to ethnologists."

SEELEY & Co. will publish this spring a translation by Professor A. H. Keane of the "Völkerkunde" of Dr. Leo Frobenius, an interesting book on the life, customs, and thoughts of primitive man. The English rendering will be entitled "The Childhood of Man," and will contain over 400 pictures drawn from authentic sources.

MR. C. V. HARTMAN, curator of the ethnological section at the Carnegie Museum in Pittsburg, has received the call to a similar position at the ethnological department of the Riks-museum in Stockholm.

WARDE FOWLER, distinguished for his writings on Roman religion, has been appointed Gifford lecturer at the University of Edinburgh for the years 1909–11.

DR. L. LÉVY-BRÜHL has been appointed to succeed Émile Boutroux, professor of the history of modern philosophy at the University of Paris.

PROFESSOR ZIEGLER, in Strausburg, has been compelled by ill health to discontinue temporarily his lectures.

THE anthropological collections made by Mr. Henry G. Bryant among the Esquimaux have been presented by him to the University of Pennsylvania.

A NEW Psycho-neurological Institute, under the direction of Professor Bechterev, was recently opened at St. Petersburg.